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Rebecca	Ray	and	Kevin	P.	Gallagher	
	
This	China-Latin	America	Economic	Bulletin	is	the	fourth	annual	note	summarizing	and	
synthesizing	trends	in	the	burgeoning	China-Latin	America	economic	relationship.	The	goal	of	
the	bulletin	is	to	provide	analysts	and	observers	a	handy	reference	to	the	ever-changing	
landscape	of	China-Latin	America	economic	relations,	a	landscape	where	data	is	not	always	as	
readily	accessible.	Highlights	from	this	year’s	edition	include:	
	
• The	“China	boom”	in	Latin	America	and	the	Caribbean	(LAC)	appears	to	be	cooling.	LAC	
exports	to	China	have	barely	grown	over	the	last	five	years,	after	doubling	during	the	
previous	five	years.	Meanwhile,	LAC	imports	from	China	have	fallen,	shrinking	the	
region’s	trade	deficit	with	China.		
	
• However,	China’s	importance	to	LAC	continues	to	soar	in	one	sector:	extractive	
industries.	China	has	maintained	its	presence	in	LAC’s	extractive	sectors,	despite	the	
slump	in	minerals	prices,	while	other	countries	like	the	US	have	pulled	back.	China	now	
purchases	over	one-fifth	of	all	of	LAC’s	extractive	exports,	and	extractive	goods	account	
for	over	half	of	LAC’s	exports	to	China.		
	
• Chinese	investment	and	finance	in	LAC	is	also	heavily	focused	on	extraction.	Mining,	
drilling,	and	refining	accounts	for	over	half	of	Chinese	mergers	and	acquisitions	in	LAC,	
and	coal,	oil,	and	natural	gas	account	for	over	half	of	public-sector	lending:	a	record	
$17.2	billion	in	2017.	
	
• A	new	official	Chinese	policy	paper	on	LAC	sets	priorities	for	the	coming	years:	a	
continued	concentration	on	natural	resources	and	energy,	but	supplemented	with	
upstream	and	downstream	investments	to	create	supply	chains	in	related	industries.	
There	are	some	sigs	of	China-LAC	moving	in	that	direction.	
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Major	Trends	in	Trade,	Investment,	and	Finance	
	
In	2016,	LAC’s	economic	relationship	with	China	did	not	move	much	in	total	quantity:	exports	
were	flat	while	investment	and	finance	fell	slightly.	However,	one	sector	in	particularly	
reinforced	its	centrality	in	all	three	major	channels:	extraction.	As	the	sections	below	show,	
China’s	interest	in	LAC	as	a	source	of	extractive	raw	materials	has	remained,	even	as	other	
economic	partners	have	shied	away	during	the	commodities	price	slump	of	the	last	several	
years.		
	
Trade			
	
In	2016,	LAC’s	exports	to	China	remained	nearly	unchanged	from	2015	and	2014,	at	$103	
billion.	But	LAC’s	imports	from	China	fell	by	14%	to	$113	billion,	shrinking	LAC’s	trade	deficit	
with	China.	This	is	not	unexpected,	given	the	region’s	falling	GDP	during	2016	(a	fall	of	0.6	
percent,	according	to	the	IMF).	In	2009	(when	the	region	was	suffering	from	the	recent	financial	
crisis	and	experienced	a	1.8	percent	drop	in	GDP)	LAC	saw	a	similar	drop	in	imports	from	China	
and	in	the	trade	deficit	with	China.	In	contrast,	LAC	exports	to	China	stayed	constant,	at	1.7	
percent	of	regional	GDP	during	that	period.	
	
FIGURE	1:	LAC	Trade	with	China,	as	a	share	of	LAC	GDP	
	
Source:	Authors’	calculations	using	China	Customs	Information	Center,	UN	Comtrade	and	World	Bank	World	
Development	Indicators	data.	Data	for	2016	are	estimates.	
	
Nevertheless,	China	continues	to	be	central	to	LAC	trade:	it	is	the	top	destination	for	South	
American	exports,	and	the	second	destination	for	all	of	LAC	exports,	after	the	United	States.	
China’s	importance	is	especially	noteworthy	among	extractive	exports,	as	Figure	2	shows.	In	
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2015,	the	most	recent	year	for	which	sector-level	data	is	available,	China	bought	a	record	22	
percent	of	LAC	extractive	exports,	up	from	18	percent	in	2014.	China	has	more	than	quadrupled	
its	market	share	of	these	exports	in	the	last	decade.		
	
FIGURE	2:	China’s	Market	Share	of	LAC	Exports,	by	Sector	
	
	
Source:	Authors’	calculations	using	UN	Comtrade	data.	
	
How	is	it	possible	to	reconcile	the	apparent	stagnation	of	the	“China	boom”	shown	in	Figure	1	
and	the	soaring	importance	of	China	among	LAC	extraction	exports	in	Figure	2?	The	answer	lies	
in	the	shrinking	importance	of	the	US,	the	largest	market	for	LAC	extractive	goods.	As	Figure	3	
shows,	LAC’s	top	extractive	exports	to	China	have	grown	–	but	this	growth	has	been	mostly	
counterbalanced	shrinking	exports	to	the	US,	which	has	seen	dramatic	drops	in	its	demand	for	
metals	from	overseas	(US	International	Trade	Commission,	2016).	In	other	words,	China	is	
effectively	substituting	for	the	traditional	relationship	with	the	US	for	these	goods.		
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FIGURE	3:	Change	in	Volume	of	LAC	Extractive	Exports	to	China	and	US,	2011-2016	
	
Source:	Authors’	calculations	based	on	UN	Comtrade	and	China	Customs	Information	Center.		
	
The	four	commodities	shown	in	Figure	3	dominate	LAC’s	exports	to	China,	along	with	soybeans.	
As	Table	1	shows,	from	2011	to	2015,	these	five	commodity	exports	accounted	for	over	two-
thirds	of	total	LAC	exports	to	China	over	the	most	recent	five	years	when	sector-level	data	is	
available.	All	of	them	were	raw	or	near-raw	agricultural	or	extractive	products.	In	contrast,	LAC	
imports	from	China	have	been	much	more	diversified.	The	top	five	imports	accounted	for	less	
than	one-fourth	of	the	total,	and	they	are	all	high-technology	manufactured	goods.		
	
TABLE	1:	Top	5	LAC-China	Exports	and	Imports,	2011-2015	
LAC	Exports	to	China	 	 LAC	Imports	from	China	 	
1.	Soybeans	and	other	
oilseeds	 19.2%	 Telecommunications	equipment	 9.7%	
2.	Iron	ore	and	concentrates	 16.8%	 Data	processing	machines	 3.8%	
3.	Crude	petroleum	 11.8%	 Optical	instruments,	apparatus	 3.3%	
4.	Copper	 11.4%	 Ships,	boats,	floating	structures	 3.3%	
5.	Copper	ores,	concentrates	 10.0%	 Other	electrical	equipment	 2.3%	
Total,	top	5	 69.2%	 Total,	top	5	 22.5%	
Source:	UN	Comtrade.	
	
This	heavy	concentration	in	primary	commodities	is	not	normal	for	LAC	exports.	As	Figure	4	
shows,	while	manufactured	goods	accounted	for	only	12	percent	of	LAC-China	exports	over	the	
last	five	years,	they	accounted	for	nearly	half	of	all	LAC	exports	to	the	world.	Moreover,	the	
concentrated	nature	of	LAC-China	exports	is	also	atypical	for	China’s	trade	with	other	regions.	
Among	all	products	bound	for	China,	worldwide,	manufacturing	accounts	for	over	two-thirds	of	
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the	total.	Thus,	the	concentration	of	raw	materials	in	LAC	exports	to	China	are	not	simply	a	
result	of	LAC	endowments	or	of	China’s	demand	for	raw	materials.	Instead,	it	is	the	result	of	a	
strategic	partnership	between	these	countries.	
	
FIGURE	4:	Sector	Distribution	of	Exports	and	Imports,	2011-2015	
	
Source:	UN	Comtrade.	
	
Investment	
	
In	2016,	Chinese	companies	invested	$3.3	billion	in	new	(greenfield)	FDI	in	LAC,	down	from	$4.8	
billion	in	2015.	However,	Chinese	companies	spent	a	much	larger	amount	on	mergers	and	
acquisitions	(M&As)	in	the	region:	$12.4	billion,	more	than	twice	2015’s	figure	of	$5.1	billion.	
This	jump	in	M&As	is	largely	due	to	one	large	acquisition	deal:	the	State	Grid	Corporation	of	
China	spent	$8.4	billion	to	acquire	a	controlling	share	of	the	Brazilian	CPFL	Energia,	the	largest	
private	power	generation	and	distribution	company	in	the	country.		
	
Figure	5	shows	the	sector	distribution	of	FDI	in	LAC,	divided	by	LAC	type:	M&As	as	well	as	new	
projects,	known	as	Greenfield	FDI	(GFDI).	In	a	continuation	of	the	trend	discussed	in	the	trade	
section	above,	Chinese	investment	has	given	special	emphasis	to	extraction.	As	Figure	5	shows,	
over	half	of	Chinese	M&As	in	LAC	over	the	last	five	years	were	in	the	sector	of	extraction	and	
refining,	compared	to	just	14%	of	other	M&As	in	the	region.	GFDI	is	more	diversified	than	
M&As	in	general,	but	Chinese	GFDIs	was	still	more	heavily	concentrated	in	extraction,	with	23%	
in	that	sector,	than	other	GFDI,	which	had	just	15%	there.			
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FIGURE	5:	Sector	Distribution	of	FDI	in	LAC,	by	Type	and	Origin,	2011-2016	
	
Source:	DeaLogic	and	fDIMarkets.	Note:	This	figure	does	not	include	the	Chinese	GFDI	project	of	the	Grand	Canal	
of	Nicaragua,	the	funds	for	which	have	only	just	begun	to	be	disbursed.	If	the	Canal	were	included,	Chinese	GFDI	in	
LAC	would	be	61%	infrastructure,	with	the	other	sectors	reduced	accordingly.			
	
This	emphasis	on	extraction	among	Chinese	investment	in	LAC	is	not	new;	it	echoes	the	findings	
of	Ray	et	al	(2017),	as	well	as	Dollar	(2017)	and	Dussel	Peters	and	Ortiz	Velásquez	(2016).	
However,	that	emphasis	may	be	beginning	to	weaken.	As	the	projection	section	below	shows,	
there	are	signs	that	Chinese	investment	in	LAC	is	beginning	to	shift	toward	downstream	
industries.	
	
This	past	year	also	saw	progress	on	some	of	the	larger	projects	mentioned	in	previous	versions	
of	the	Bulletin.	For	example:		
	
• The	Nicaragua	Canal	project	has	finished	its	archeological	surveying	process,	clearing	the	
way	for	the	project	to	move	forward.	The	HKND	Group	has	announced	that	it	expects	to	
begin	construction	work	this	year	(“Obras”	2017).	
	
• A	Chinese	government	space-monitoring	base	is	nearing	completion	in	Patagonia,	
Argentina.	The	People’s	Liberation	Army	hopes	to	use	the	base	to	support	an	upcoming	
lunar	mission	as	early	as	2017	(Lee,	2016).		
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Finance	
	
Chinese	public-sector	lending	in	LAC	fell	in	2016,	from	$27.2	to	$22.4	billion.	However,	lending	
for	coal,	oil,	and	natural	gas	rose	dramatically,	to	a	record-setting	$17.2	billion.	This	category	
includes	just	a	few	large	loans,	all	from	the	China	Development	Bank:	a	total	of	$15.0	billion	to	
Brazilian	state-owned	oil	company	Petrobras,	and	$2.2	billion	to	Venezuelan	state-owned	oil	
company	PDVSA.	Both	countries	are	struggling	economically,	and	over	the	last	several	years	
they	have	borrowed	from	Chinese	lenders	during	times	of	falling	oil	prices,	when	other	
financing	has	been	scarce.	Non-oil	lending,	in	contrast,	has	shrunk	to	its	lowest	level	in	eight	
years.			
	
FIGURE	6:	Public-Sector	Chinese	Finance	to	LAC,	2012-2016,	by	Sector	
	
Note:	These	data	do	not	perfectly	match	the	data	in	Gallagher	and	Myers	(2017),	because	the	latter	limit	their	
analysis	to	development	banks:	the	China	Development	Bank	and	the	Export-Import	Bank	of	China.	For	this	paper,	
it	is	more	relevant	to	include	all	Chinese	public-sector	sources	of	financing,	including	state-owned	commercial	
banks	and	state-owned	enterprises.	
	
Beyond	PDVSA	and	Petrobras,	China	also	continued	to	lend	substantially	to	Ecuador.	In	2016,	
Ecuador	borrowed	$970	million	from	the	state-owned	Industrial	and	Commercial	Bank	of	China	
and	$1.5	billion	from	the	China	Development	Bank	(CDB)	for	discretionary	spending,	in	addition	
to	$500	million	from	CDB	for	infrastructure	projects.	However,	this	represents	a	drop	of	more	
than	50%	compared	to	2015,	when	Ecuador	borrowed	a	total	of	$7.5	billion	from	China.	
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Looking	Forward:	Short-Term	Pain,	Long-Term	Change?	
	
The	next	few	years	promise	to	be	difficult	ones	for	exporters	of	raw	materials.	The	price	
declines	that	began	in	late	2014	show	no	signs	of	reversing	soon.	Figure	7	shows	the	prices	of	
LAC’s	four	top	commodity	exports	to	China:	soybeans,	petroleum,	iron,	and	copper.	Since	2014,	
these	four	commodities	have	lost	between	one-fifth	and	one-half	of	their	value.		According	to	
the	IMF	and	the	World	Bank,	they	aren’t	expected	to	return	to	their	2014	levels	for	the	next	
several	years.	If	prices	follow	these	projections,	LAC’s	terms	of	trade	with	China	will	suffer,	
along	with	its	ability	to	continue	to	attract	Chinese	FDI,	and	LAC	oil	companies	may	seek	to	
borrow	more	from	China	in	the	coming	years.		
	
FIGURE	7:	IMF	and	World	Bank	Projections	for	Commodity	Prices	
	
Source:	IMF	and	World	Bank.	
	
However,	the	impact	of	these	low	prices	may	be	blunted	somewhat	if	LAC	begins	to	diversify	
away	from	relying	on	raw	materials.	In	November	of	2016,	China	released	a	new	“Policy	Paper	
on	Latin	America	and	the	Caribbean”	to	guide	the	next	several	years	of	their	relationship	
(Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	2016).	It	foresees	a	transition	toward	upstream	and	downstream	
industries	with	these	traditional	sectors,	in	order	to	export	“high	added-value,	and	technology-
intensive	products.”	The	policy	paper	expands	on	this	point:	
	
China	wishes	to	expand	and	deepen	cooperation	in	the	fields	of	energy	and	resources	
with	Latin	American	and	Caribbean	countries	based	on	the	principle	of	win-win	
cooperation	and	sustainable	development.	Efforts	will	be	made	to	bring	cooperation	to	
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upstream	business	such	as	exploration	and	development,	so	as	to	consolidate	the	
foundation	for	cooperation	and	expand	resources	potentials;	and	at	the	same	time,	
cooperation	will	be	extended	to	downstream	and	supporting	industries	such	as	
smelting,	processing,	logistics	trade	and	equipment	manufacturing,	so	as	to	improve	
added	value	of	products.	
	
The	policy	paper	also	prioritizes	infrastructure	investment,	in	order	“to	build	production	lines	
and	maintenance	service	bases	in	the	region	for	construction	materials,	non-ferrous	metals,	
engineering	machinery,	locomotives	and	rolling	stock,	electric	power	and	communication	
equipment.”	Ultimately,	the	report	envisions	these	infrastructure	investments	allowing	the	
relationship	to	diversify,	to	include	“automobiles,	new	energy	equipment,	motorcycles	and	
chemical	industry.”	
	
Will	these	ideas	come	to	fruition?	Early	signs	seem	to	indicate	that	they	may.	The	top	Chinese	
investment	deals	in	LAC	in	2016	mostly	follow	the	pattern	set	out	in	China’s	policy	paper.	While	
they	focus	on	raw	materials	and	energy,	they	also	include	upstream	and	downstream	
investments	that	could	contribute	to	the	development	of	supply	chains.	For	example,	the	top	
five	Chinese	GFDI	projects	include	a	steel	and	iron	mill,	an	automobile	factory,	and	a	pre-
fabricated	house	factory,	as	shown	in	Table	2.		
	
TABLE	2:	Top	Chinese	FDI	Deals	in	LAC	in	2016,	by	Type	
No.	 Investing	Company	 Project	Country	 Project	description	 Sector	
Size	
(USDm)	
Greenfield	FDI	Projects	
1	 Petrolera	Sinovensa1	 Venez.	 Oil	dehydration	and	
desalination	plant		
Refining	 $549	
2	 Sinosteel	 Bolivia	 Siderúrgica	del	Mutún		 Steel,	iron	mill	 $450	
3	 Zotye	Holdings	 Brazil	 Automobile	factory	 Manufacturing	 $307	
4	 Jinko	Solar	 Mexico	 188	MWac	solar	farm	 Alt.	energy	 $224	
5	 Sany	Heavy	Industry		 Argent.	 Pre-fabricated	house	
factory	
Manufacturing	 $133	
Mergers	and	Acquisitions	
1	 State	Grid	Corp.	of	China	 Brazil	 CPFL	Energia	(29%	stake	
increase)2	
Energy	(divers.)	 $8,421	
2	 China	Molybdenum	 Brazil	 Anglo	American’s	niobium	
and	phosphates	business		
Mining,	refining,	
and	chemicals	
$1,687	
3	 China	Three	Gorges	Corp.	 Brazil	 Duke	Energy’s	assets		 Hydropower	 $1,200	
4	 Jiunquan	Iron	and	Steel	 Jamaica	 Alumina	Partners	of	
Jamaica,	from	UC	Rusal	
Refining	 $299	
5	 Hunan	Dakang	Int’l.	Food	
and	Agriculture	Co.	
Brazil	 Fiagrill	Ltda	(57%	stake)	 Agricultural	
supplies	
$200	
Source:	fDiMarkets,	DeaLogic.		
Notes:	1.	Petrolera	Sinovensa	is	a	subsidiary	of	the	state-owned	China	National	Petroleum	Corporation	
(CNPC).	This	project	is	an	expansion	of	a	current	plant.	2.	State	Grid	Corp.	of	China’s	stake	increase	in	CPFL	
Energy	was	announced	in	2016,	but	not	completed	until	2017.			
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If	these	initial	steps	toward	diversification	materialize,	it	may	signal	China’s	willingness	to	
collaborate	with	LAC	on	a	new	approach	to	the	region’s	longstanding	goal	of	industrialization.	
Lin	and	Wang	(2016)	refer	to	this	new	approach	as	“new	structural	economics”	of	Chinese	
cooperation.	This	new	approach,	which	they	also	dub	“development	economics	3.0”	in	a	
reference	to	the	past	waves	of	import	substitution	industrialization	and	neoliberalism,	refers	to	
developing	industries	within	countries’	traditional	areas	of	comparative	advantage.	At	least	one	
of	the	projects	in	Table	2,	Sinosteel’s	investment	in	Bolivia’s	Siderúrgica	del	Mutún,	represents	
such	an	approach.	In	that	approach.	The	Export-Import	Bank	of	China	provided	85%	of	the	
finance	for	this	steel	mill,	with	the	remaining	financing	coming	from	the	government	of	Bolivia.	
Sinosteel	plans	to	begin	building	the	steel	mill	this	year,	and	then	have	a	one-year	concession	
after	it	is	completed	before	turning	the	plant	over	to	the	Bolivian	government.	The	plant	is	
planned	next	to	an	existing	iron	mine,	and	the	government	hopes	that	its	creation	will	allow	for	
exports	of	more	refined	versions	of	the	metal	(Chipana	Mamani	2017	and	Corz	2016).		
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